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The paper discusses global imbalances under the aspect of an asymmetric world monetary system. 
It identifies the US and euro area (Germany) as center countries with rising current account deficits 
(US) and surpluses (Germany) which are matched by respective current account surpluses of coun-
tries stabilizing their exchange rates against the dollar (dollar periphery) and rising current account 
deficits of the countries stabilizing their exchange rate against the euro (euro periphery). The paper 
finds that the changes of the world current account positions are driven by the macroeconomic pol-
icy decisions in the centers. In particular, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in the US are 
argued to have triggered rising current account surpluses of the dollar periphery countries, as mone-
tary and fiscal sterilization policies in the periphery contribute to rising saving surpluses.  
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  2Non-technical summary 
 
The paper investigates the determinants of asymmetric current account behaviour of center and pe-
riphery countries within an asymmetric world monetary system. The argument is built upon the fact 
that the dollar is the dominant international money and the euro has become an important regional 
international currency (section 2). In addition the macroeconomic policy behaviour of center and 
periphery countries is argued to be asymmetric. The US and the euro area focus their macroeco-
nomic policies decisions on domestic targets such as price stability and growth. In contrast, the 
countries at the periphery of the US and euro area stabilize their exchange rates against dollar and 
euro. Comparing the macroeconomic policy behaviour of US and euro area, US macroeconomic 
policies have tended to be more active and more expansionary due to a different institutional set-
ting.  
 
Given the asymmetric nature of the world monetary system, the paper identifies a current account 
asymmetry matrix which is characterized by a rising US current account deficit and rising current 
account surpluses of the countries stabilizing their exchange rates against the dollar. In Europe, a 
rising current account surplus of Germany is matched by current account deficits of Emerging 
Europe and many industrialized European countries. This also implies an asymmetric current ac-
count behaviour between the dollar and the euro peripheries as well as between the US and Ger-
many. Twin deficits in US are matched by twin surpluses in dollar periphery countries.  
 
Section 3 discusses the international transmission of current account imbalances. Principally a 
transmission of current account balances from peripheries to the centers is possible. Yet, the asym-
metric nature of the world monetary systems which allows the US a high degree of freedom in mac-
roeconomic decisions implies that macroeconomic policy impulses originate in the centers and are 
transmitted via macroeconomic policies, exchange rates and prices to the peripheries. This has an 
impact on relative current account positions. In particular, monetary policy impulses in the centers 
are transmitted via different forms of exchange rate stabilization to the peripheries. Expansionary 
monetary policies in the centers can lead in the face of rising inflation and overheating to restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies in form of sterilization operations. Then, restrictive macroeconomic 
policy stances relative to the center explain rising current account surpluses of periphery countries 
which are recycled in the financial markets of the centers. In the case of oil and raw material coun-
tries, rising raw material prices can be seen as the transmission channel for rising imbalances. 
 
In section 4, panel estimations test for a set of 101 countries for current account interdependence 
and transmission channels. The estimations confirm the crucial role of the US current account defi-
cit for current account surpluses in the dollar periphery countries and Germany. In Europe, rising 
current account deficits in Emerging Europe and many industrialized European countries can be 
explained by a rising German current account surplus. US and euro area monetary policies are iden-
tified to be the main transmission channel of global imbalances. Furthermore, raw material prices 
and periphery reserve accumulation which are both dependent on monetary policy decisions in the 
centers have transmitted global imbalances during the observation period of 1980 to 2006. The pa-
per concludes with an outlook concerning the evolvement of the global imbalances in response to 
the subprime and world financial crisis (section 5). 
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1.  Introduction 
Originating in a persistent current account imbalance between the United States and China, a con-
troversial discussion about global imbalances has emerged.  Explanations for the global imbalances 
as discussed in the academic literature range from a worldwide saving glut (Bernanke 2005) via 
mercantilist trade strategies of the East Asian countries (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004) 
to a US saving deficiency (Chinn 2005). The economic policy discussion has focused on the ad-
justment of exchange rates, in particular if the Chinese dollar peg should be loosened (Frankel 
2006, McKinnon and Schnabl 2006, Cheung, Chinn and Fujii 2007, Feldstein 2008). Up to the pre-
sent few papers such as Herrmann and Winkler (2008) have scrutinized the asymmetric nature of 
global imbalances with respect to asymmetric current account behavior and idiosyncratic macro-
economic policies in “center” and “periphery” economies.   
 
In this paper, center countries (US and euro area) are defined as large economies with strong inter-
national trade ties and large financial markets which provide an international currency to the world 
monetary system. The US dollar is the leading international currency as most international trade and 
capital flows outside of Europe are denominated in the US currency. During the last decade macro-
economic policies in the US have tended to be expansionary and the US has exhibited a rising cur-
rent account deficit. Albeit less than the dollar, the international role of the euro has been increasing 
steadily in and beyond Europe (ECB 2008). This has triggered an extensive discussion if, and to 
what extend the euro can challenge the dollar as an international currency (Chinn and Frankel 
2005). Compared to the US, macroeconomic policies in the euro area have tended be restrictive. 
The current account of Germany as the euro area’s largest economy has shown increasing surpluses 
while other EMU members such as Italy and Spain have experienced increasing deficits. The ag-
gregated current account of the euro area has been by and large balanced. 
 
Mirroring the status of the US and the euro area as centers of the world monetary system the small 
open economies bordering the US and the euro area are dubbed periphery countries. We character-
ize periphery countries as (small) open economies with underdeveloped financial markets which 
tend to stabilize their exchange rates either against the dollar (such as most (Latin) American, East 
Asian and oil exporting countries) or against the euro (such as most non-euro European countries 
which maintain strong economic or institutional linkages with the European (Monetary) Union). 
The current accounts of the euro and dollar peripheries have behaved asymmetrically as dollar pe-
  4riphery countries have tended to run current account surpluses, while euro area periphery countries 
have mostly run deficits.  
 
This is shown by Figure 1 which plots the smoothed shares of countries with current account sur-
pluses in single periphery country groups. Whereas the current account deficits of Emerging Europe 
are in line with Lucas’ (1990) assumption that capital should flow from rich to poor countries, in the 
dollar periphery the capital is flowing uphill from the periphery to the center. This implies, as will 
be  shown an asymmetry matrix of world current accounts which is based on structural asymmetries 
in the use of international currencies as well as asymmetric macroeconomic policy behavior in cen-
ter and periphery countries.  
 
 
2.  Asymmetries in the World Monetary System 
 
While the recent discussion on global imbalances has focused on the role of exchange rate policies 
for positive or negative current account positions (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004, Cline 
2005, McKinnon 2007, Fratzscher 2008), the imbalances in the world monetary system can be cha-
racterized in different ways depending on structural criteria such as size, macroeconomic policy 
behavior or simply the sign of current account balances. Structural asymmetries arise from the very 
fact that worldwide international transactions tend to be – due to network externalities and econo-
mies of scale – denominated in a few international currencies. This can be argued to have implica-
tions for the macroeconomic policy behavior in anchor and periphery countries as well as for the 
respective current account positions as summarized by the current account asymmetry matrix in 
section 2.3. 
 
2.1 Structural Asymmetries 
 
The present prominent role of the dollar as international money originated in the US post-war po-
litical and economic hegemony under the Bretton Woods System. It persists due to network exter-
nalities and economies of scale which determine the currency habitat in emerging markets with un-
derdeveloped capital markets. Backed by the large size of US goods and financial markets – outside 
of Europe – throughout the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) the dollar is the dominating international means of payment, unit of account and store 
of value.  
  5Private international agents in the dollar periphery use the dollar as common international money to 
facilitate multilateral exchanges in goods, services and capital flows. Low transactions costs in the 
international use of the dollar not only extend to transactions involving the US, but also for transac-
tions within the dollar periphery, for instance when Thailand trades with Malaysia, or capital is 
transferred from Argentina to Brazil. Even beyond the dollar bloc, most commodity trade of oil, 
copper, coal etc. is invoiced and settled in US dollars as international medium of exchange. Deep 
and liquid US-capital markets support the dollars’ role as international store of value for revenues 
arising from goods, services and commodity trade. Given underdeveloped capital markets, private 
agents in the periphery countries denominate short-term international capital transactions as well as 
asset holdings outside of Europe in the US currency. 
 
The network externalities originating in the ubiquitous private international use of the dollar are 
further enhanced by public agents who use the dollar as an anchor, intervention and reserve cur-
rency. Because many countries in the US periphery lack a history of macroeconomic stability, an-
choring the exchange rate to the dollar is used as a tool for (domestic) macroeconomic stabilization 
(McKinnon 1963). By pegging to the dollar, emerging markets with large industrial sectors (like in 
East Asia) anchor their price levels to world markets to provide favourable conditions for manufac-
turing exports which are an important source of growth dynamics. Commodity exporting countries 
peg their currencies to the dollar to stabilize export revenues which are generated in dollars and are 
the main source of public and national income. In industrialized peripheries with a high degree of 
partition of labour such as East Asia, common dollar pegs prevent competitive depreciations and 
minimize transaction costs for intra-regional supply chains (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004).  
 
Beyond this goods market perspective, public agents in emerging markets peg to dollar because 
capital markets are underdeveloped and do not provide sufficient low cost tools to hedge foreign 
exchange risk. From a short-term perspective, governments provide a hedge for foreign exchange 
risk of short-term payments flows by smoothing day-to-day and week-to-week exchange rate fluc-
tuations. From a long-term perspective, emerging market and developing debtor countries fear de-
preciations because the value of dollar denominated international debt would grow in terms of do-
mestic currency (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004). Emerging market creditors, as they now prevail in 
East Asia and among the oil exporting countries, resist appreciation because surplus export earnings 
are recycled on dollar denominated financial markets and a fall of the dollar would erode the value 
of international assets in terms of domestic currencies (McKinnon and Schnabl 2009).  
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Given the extensive use of the dollar as an international means of payments, unit of account and 
store of value for private and public agents outside of Europe, the dollar’s role as dominating inter-
national money is a natural monopoly which is difficult to displace. Even phases of strong dollar 
depreciation and financial turmoil in the US which have been accompanied by financial instability 
and imported inflation in the countries pegging to the dollar, have not eroded the dollar’s role as an 
international currency. (Long-term) benefits of economies of scale seem to outweigh the losses 
originating in the instability of the US currency.  
 
Despite the dollar’s dominant role as an international currency, the euro has established itself as 
(regional) international money in Europe and its neighbouring regions. Given the substantial size of 
the European goods and financial markets, the euro has steadily gained international importance 
since its introduction in 1999. Beyond the EMU, the euro is used as a vehicle currency for goods 
and payments transactions with the EMU members and among the European non-EMU countries. 
An increasing number of countries with institutional linkages to the European (Monetary) Union 
such as Lithuania and Bulgaria have redirected their exchange rate strategies towards the euro. 
(Tight) euro pegs are maintained by interventions in euro and foreign reserves are increasingly held 
in euro denominated assets.    
 
Also beyond the European Union and the countries which are associated with the EU as candidate 
or potential candidate countries, private and public agents have increased the use of the euro for 
their international transactions (ECB 2008). The euro has gained a prominent role in the issuances 
of international debt securities, cross border loans and foreign exchange trading. It has served as an 
exchange rate anchor in the Russian currency basket with the share of the euro in Russian foreign 
exchange holdings increasing. While the role of the euro in East Asian and Middle Eastern foreign 
exchange holdings remains uncertain, a discussion has emerged whether the euro can challenge the 
dollar as an international currency (Chinn and Frankel 2005, Galati and Wooldridge 2006).   
 
Given the asymmetric use of national monies for international exchange as discussed above, a styl-
ized pattern of the world monetary system is shown in Figure 2. The US dollar remains the domi-
nant world currency with a large number of countries pegging their currencies more or less tightly 
to the dollar. The most important regions which maintain common dollar pegs (and therefore infor-
mal dollar standards) are East Asia, the Middle East, (Latin) America and the Commonwealth of 
  7Independent States including Russia.
1 While East Asia’s export structure is dominated by manufac-
tured goods, the latter three regions are important primary goods and food exporters. The euro is the 
second (regional) international currency with a flexible rate against the dollar. In the backyard of 
the euro area an increasing number of- mostly emerging -European countries are pegging their cur-
rencies to the euro. This implies flexible exchange rates between the euro and the dollar periphery.  
 
2.2. Macroeconomic Policy Asymmetries 
 
The structural asymmetries of the world monetary system are reflected in the different macroeco-
nomic policy behavior of anchor and periphery countries, in particular with respect to the weight of 
the exchange rate in monetary policy reaction functions. Comparing the center countries, the US 
exhibits a different macro policy behavior than the euro area due to different institutional settings 




The US and the euro area as large, comparatively closed economies with deep financial markets 
base their monetary policy decisions on domestic targets such as price stability, output and financial 
stability.
2 External targets such as exchange rate stability and export competitiveness are subordi-
nated, with the exchange rate being left to float freely. Foreign exchange intervention takes place 
only on discretionary basis and is rare.
3 If the central banks of the center countries decide to inter-
vene in foreign exchange markets the purchases and sales of foreign currency are fully sterilized to 
ensure that the domestic monetary policy targets are not hampered by exchange rate considerations.  
 
The fact that domestic (government) bonds are a reliable store of value backed by deep and liquid 
financial markets is reflected in the balance sheets of the central banks. The left panels of the central 
bank balance sheet matrix in Figure 3 visualize the process of money creation in center countries. In 
the case of the Federal Reserve (until the subprime market crisis) outright purchases of US govern-
ment bonds are reflected by rising claims on the central government on the asset side of the balance 
sheet (upper left panel of Figure 3) and an increase of reserve money on the liability side. Foreign 
                                                 
1   The composition of the single country groups is listed in Table 1. The African countries partly peg to the euro, and 
partly to the dollar. They are not included in the sample for parsimony reasons.  
2   As reflected by the Taylor rule. 
3   Japan, which adopted a flexible exchange rate regime in the early 1970s, is treated here as a periphery country be-
cause the exchange rate plays a crucial role for monetary policy decision making (McKinnon and Ohno 1997). As a 
result, Japan is the world’s second largest holder of foreign (dollar) reserves.  
  8assets remain widely unchanged. The European Central Bank controls money supply via re-
purchase agreements for a predefined set of euro area bonds with high credit worthiness. As shown 
in the lower left panel of Figure 3 money creation of the Eurosystem is based on both claims on 
government and on the private sector. While stocks of foreign reserves in the Eurosystems’ balance 
sheets are higher compared to the Federal Reserve because of the heritage of past exchange rate 
stabilization, changes in foreign reserves holdings are small and mainly due to valuation effects.  
 
While this stylized pattern of monetary policy making of center country central banks applies to 
both the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, different monetary and fiscal policy be-
havior can be linked to different institutional environments. The Federal Reserve follows pari passu 
a set of targets, namely price stability, growth, and financial stability. There is no numerical target 
for consumer price inflation. Both factors provide a considerable leeway for discretionary monetary 
policy decisions. In contrast, the European Central Bank follows a clear hierarchy in monetary pol-
icy targets. Price stability is supraordinated to growth and a reference value for inflation is fixed 
(close) to 2%.  The leeway to respond to short-term (financial market) developments is smaller. As 
shown in the upper left panel of Figure 4, the ECB main refinancing rate has been more stable com-
pared to the US federal funds rate.  
 
The national fiscal policies of the EMU member states are subject to restrictions as laid down in the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Given that many EMU general government 
deficits are close or even above the Maastricht ceilings, the scope for active Keynesian fiscal stimu-
lus is small. As shown in the lower left panel of Figure 4 the general government deficits of the euro 
area and of Germany as the largest EMU economy exhibited less fluctuations than in the US where 
governments have tended to take active anti-cyclical measures in times of (expected) recession.  
 
Furthermore, there are different attitudes towards monetary and fiscal policy coordination. Given 
the Mundell-Fleming framework (Mundell 1962, Fleming 1962) under flexible exchange rates as 
they prevail in US and the euro area, the effectiveness of an expansionary fiscal policy is limited 
due to interest rate increases and exchange rate appreciation. Fiscal expansion is more effective 
when it is accompanied by a contemporaneous monetary expansion which keeps domestic interest 
rates low and softens appreciation pressure.  Such coordination of macroeconomic policies is sug-
gested for the US by the upper right panel of Figure 4 which shows declining interest rates in times 
of fiscal expansion and vice versa. From an institutional point of view, macroeconomic policy coor-
  9dination is possible because growth enters the target function of both the government and the cen-
tral bank.  
 
In the euro area, the scope for such coordination is small for three reasons. First, discretionary fiscal 
policies are restricted by EU legislation, in particular if government deficits and stocks of public 
debt are close to, or above the Maastricht ceilings. Second, the central bank is independent from the 
national government and indebted primarily to price stability. Third, while monetary policy is 
shifted to the supra-national level, the competence for fiscal policies remains on the national level. 
A one-size monetary policy is not able to take idiosyncratic national fiscal policy stances into ac-
count. As shown in the lower right panel of Figure 4, interest rates do less reflect changes in the 
aggregated government balance.  
 
Periphery countries  
 
The monetary and exchange rate policies of the periphery countries mirror the monetary policies of 
the center countries because external – instead of domestic – considerations play a dominant role 
for monetary policy making. While center countries smooth short-term interest rates to ensure fi-
nancial market stability, periphery countries smooth the exchange rate. Exchange rates are pegged 
tightly to the currencies of the center countries based on currency board arrangements (such as 
Hong Kong or Estonia), tight conventional pegs (Saudi Arabia and Latvia) or even via outright dol-
larization/euroization (Ecuador and Montenegro). Alternatively, soft pegs allow for different de-
grees of exchange rate flexibility in the form of downward (Slovenia up to 2007) or upward crawl-
ing pegs (China since July 2005), tightly managed floats (Malaysia and Croatia) or other discretion-
ary forms of exchange rate stabilization (Korea, Hungary, Romania, Turkey).  
 
Whereas in most cases exchange rates are stabilized versus one anchor currency, periphery coun-
tries may choose to peg to both dollar and euro based on currency basket arrangements (Russia or 
Morocco).  Whichever type of exchange rate stabilization periphery countries choose, they smooth 
exchange rate fluctuations to import macro and microeconomic stability. By absorbing nominal 
exchange rate shocks the price levels of small open economies are stabilized, transactions costs for 
international currency denominated goods and financial flows are reduced, and fluctuations in the 
balance sheets of enterprises and financial institutions are minimized.  
 
  10The consequence of tight or soft, official or unofficial dollar or euro pegs is reflected on the asset 
side of the periphery central banks’ balance sheets. The most important item is foreign reserves 
which builds the basis for reserve money creation. Even in the case of freely floating periphery 
economies (such as Poland) the asset side of the balance sheet is dominated by foreign rather than 
domestic assets. Domestic government bonds or claims on the private sector on the asset side of the 
balance sheet tend to reflect quasi government financing or bailouts in response to the financial 
market crisis rather than monetary policy operations which aim to keep prices stable (Schnabl and 
Schobert 2008).   
 
The right hand side of the central bank balance sheet matrix (Figure 3) shows two typical balance 
sheets of periphery central banks.
4 In the case of both the Peoples Bank of China (dollar periphery) 
and the Estonian Central Bank (euro periphery) foreign reserves are the most important item on the 
asset side of the balance sheet. Claims on government and on the private sector play only a marginal 
role for reserve money creation. From a long-term perspective, when output grows the necessary 
increase in reserve money is via the accumulation of foreign reserves, i.e. through purchases of cen-
ter country governments bonds. As a result interest rates in periphery countries are dependent on the 
monetary policy of the centers. If interest rates in the center decline, capital flows are redirected 
towards the peripheries, and the currency of the periphery country appreciates. To keep the ex-
change rate stable, foreign reserves are accumulated and reserve money expands.  
  
The fiscal policies in periphery countries can be seen as dependent or independent from the macro-
economic policies of the centers (depending on the business cycle). First, in particular in times of 
recession, with central banks being formally or informally dependent on governments, government 
expenditure may be financed via inflation tax. Central banks accumulate government securities on 
the assets side of their balance sheets. The outcome is a liquidity surplus in domestic financial mar-
kets, inflationary pressure and exchange rate depreciation as observed in many Emerging European 
economies during the 1990s.  
 
In times of buoyant capital inflows and economic prosperity the need for government financing via 
the central bank will decline, as monetary expansion, credit and output growth contribute to fiscal 
consolidation. Then fiscal policy can be seen as being linked to monetary policies in the center 
countries, because low interest rates in large financial markets contribute via capital inflows to fis-
cal consolidation. As shown on the right hand side of general government debt matrix (Figure 5), in 
  11the new millennium in particular, the dollar periphery governments have experienced strongly im-
proving general government balances. In the euro periphery this trend was less pronounced with 
fiscal consolidation taking place only since 2003. In both cases fiscal consolidation can be seen as 
the outcome of low interest levels in the center countries rather than autonomous tax and expendi-
ture policies in periphery countries. 
 
2.3  Current Account Asymmetries, Twin Deficits and Twin Surpluses 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, the asymmetries in the use of international currencies and macro-
economic policies have been accompanied by rising global imbalances as shown in the current ac-
count asymmetry matrix (Figure 6). Along the upper horizontal axis the current account deficit of 
the US is matched by a current account surplus of the dollar periphery. Along the right vertical axis 
the current account surplus of the dollar periphery is matched by a current account deficit of the 
euro periphery.  
 
The asymmetry along the lower horizontal axis and the left vertical axes is not visible if the euro 
area is considered as center because the current account of the euro area has been widely balanced. 
This changes if Germany is regarded as center: since the turn of the millennium the rising current 
account surplus of Germany is matched by a rising US deficit (vertical axis). Along the lower hori-
zontal axis, the rising German current account surplus is accompanied by a rising current account 
deficit of the euro periphery.  
 
An addition, intra-European asymmetry is revealed if Western Europe is decomposed into Germany 
and Industrialized Europe excluding Germany. While Germany as the largest EMU member (and 
the former center country of European Monetary System) and some smaller northern European 
countries exhibit rising current account surpluses, most southern European countries (in particular 
France, Italy and Spain) have moved into deficits. While the imbalance between the US and the 
dollar periphery were already visible during the 1980s, Germany joins the asymmetry matrix only at 
the turn of the millennium.
5  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4    Schnabl and Schobert (2008) use the terminology “debtor central bank” because periphery central banks are nor-
mally in a debtor position to domestic financial markets.  
5   A possible reason why Germany becomes a structural current account surplus country only at the turn of the millen-
nium is that the German unification turned Germany temporarily from a structural current account surplus country 
into a deficit country.  
  123.  Transmission Channels 
 
While the asymmetric nature of world current accounts as shown by the current account asymmetry 
matrix (Figure 6) can be attributed to the fact that the aggregated current account surpluses and def-
icits by definition add up to zero, two “conundrums” remain. First, little research has been done 
concerning the question of why the global imbalances have increased since the mid 1990s. Second, 
little is known about the reasons for why certain country groups such as the East Asian countries, 
the raw material exporting countries or Emerging Europe behave symmetrically with respect to 
their peers and asymmetrically with respect to their centers. 
 
Second, the direction of causality matters. Are the complementary trends in global imbalances dri-
ven by the centers or the peripheries? Most research concerning this issue has been done with re-
spect to East Asia. A causality running from East Asian current account surpluses to the US current 
account deficit is suggested by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber’s (2004) export-led growth 
hypothesis as well as by Bernanke’s (2005) notion of a global saving glut. They attribute the US-
East Asian current account imbalance to the fact that the East Asian countries keep their exchange 
rates artificially undervalued to promote growth, or exhibit a chronic saving surplus which is fun-
neled into US financial markets. Yet, both theories do not explicitly address the question of why 
periphery countries tend to behave in the same way. For instance, while East Asia today exhibits 
almost uniformly a current account surplus (Figure 1), prior to the Asian crisis East Asia was subdi-
vided into surplus (Japan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan) and deficit countries (Korea, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia).  
 
The coordinated macroeconomic policy behavior of a set of periphery countries can be attributed to 
the fact that “core” periphery countries are imitated by other countries in the region. For instance, 
Cheung and Qian (2007) find with respect to reserve accumulation in East Asia, a keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses effect: as one East Asian country starts to hoard foreign reserves –  for instance to build 
up a war chest against possible currency crisis  –  others follow to meet the benchmark set by the 
first mover. The whole process culminates into an irrational competitive hoarding behavior which 
has led to an unprecedented upward-trend in reserve accumulation. 
 
While the keeping-up-with-Joneses effect provides a stimulating framework to explain the symmet-
ric behavior of the East Asian countries with respect to reserve accumulation, it does not explain 
why other country groups with different structural characteristics than East Asia such as the (Latin) 
  13American or Middle Eastern (Emerging European) countries tend to behave in the same (or a dif-
ferent way). Due to the asymmetric world monetary system with its implications on an asymmetric 
macroeconomic policy behavior of center as outlined in section two, we assume a reverse causality: 
rising deficits of large centers produce are assumed to produce rising surpluses in an increasing 
number of periphery countries.  
 
To explain how current account deficits (surpluses) in the center are transformed into surpluses 
(deficits) at the periphery, we identify two types of transmission channels. First, there is a possible 
transmission from the center’s macroeconomic policies to the macroeconomic policies of the pe-
riphery, with the exchange rate policies being the main link. Second, there is transmission via rela-
tive prices in line with the elasticity approach to the current account. Of course, macroeconomic 
policies and exchange rate and price developments tend to interact. 
 
3.1. Macroeconomic Policy Transmission 
 
Monetary and fiscal policies affect current accounts in line with the absorption approach (Johnson 
1958) via the aggregated saving and investment behavior. Given the asymmetric nature of the world 
monetary system, changes in the monetary stance in the center – as for instance experienced in the 
US between 2000 and 2003 and since 2007 – is likely to lead, independent from the exchange rate 
regime, to lower periphery interest rates for three reasons.  
 
Reserve Accumulation and Monetary Policies 
 
First, if the periphery currency is tightly pegged to the center currency, interest changes in the cen-
ter are directly translated into interest rates changes in the periphery. As interest rates in the center 
decline, rising capital inflows into the periphery trigger foreign currency purchases by periphery 
central banks. In the central bank balance sheets increasing stocks of foreign reserves on the asset 
side are matched by a proportional increase of reserve money on the liability side. Given open capi-
tal accounts and a credibly fixed exchange rate the interest rate of the periphery converges towards 
the center. For instance the interest rates of periphery countries with currency board arrangements 
such as Hong Kong ($) and Estonia (€) have followed closely, except in crisis periods, the interest 
rates of the centers.  
 
  14Second, in the case of soft peg arrangements, the periphery central bank may not respond directly to 
a change in the monetary stance of the center central bank. As interest rates in the center decline, 
the periphery central bank may in the first place keep the interest rate unchanged and allow for an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, for instance to hold down domestic inflation. Yet as long as 
an interest rate spread persists, capital inflows are reinforced by strengthening appreciation expecta-
tions. Foreign exchange intervention is likely to set in to smooth “excessive” appreciation. The 
stock of foreign reserves increases, the monetary base expands and interest rates converge.  
 
Third, even under a flexible exchange rate regime without any foreign exchange intervention, it is 
unlikely that periphery central banks will keep interest rates high. As rising capital inflows will 
cause appreciation pressure, exports will tend to decline. Even if monetary authorities remain absent 
from the foreign exchange market they may strive to soften the appreciation and inflationary pres-
sure caused by capital inflows by outright interest rate cuts. If domestic bond markets are underde-
veloped and illiquid, these interest rate cuts are likely to take place via outright purchases of foreign 
government bonds which are more liquid and a more reliable store of value than domestic bonds.  
 
The asymmetric monetary policy behavior of center and periphery countries is reflected by an 
asymmetric pattern of money creation as shown in Figure 7.
6 As output grows over time money 
creation in the US and the euro area takes place via the accumulation of domestic bonds, i.e. claims 
on the government and claims on the private sector. In contrast, in the balance sheets of the periph-
ery central banks foreign assets, i.e. holdings of US and euro area government bonds, expand. Fig-
ure 7 also shows that the foreign reserve holdings of the dollar periphery central banks have reached 
more than four times the volume of the Federal Reserves’ assets providing immense scope for issu-
ing dollar currency. In contrast, the reserve holdings of the euro periphery are small compared to the 
ECB assets.  
 
Sterilization Policies and Fiscal Coordination 
 
Provided that monetary policies in the centers and the peripheries tend to move in parallel they can 
be assumed to have a similar impact on the current account positions. Low interest rates and buoy-
ant domestic activity are likely to contribute to rising imports and increasing current account defi-
                                                 
6   Central banks seldom publish the currency composition of their foreign reserves. In general, central banks may strive 
to diversify the currency composition of their reserves, but for simplicity we assume that dollar periphery countries 
tend to hold dollar assets (because they stabilize the exchange rate against the dollar) and that euro periphery coun-
tries tend to hold euro assets (because they stabilize the exchange rate against the euro).  
  15cits. The impact on bilateral current account positions is indeterminate. But given low interest rates 
in the large financial markets, both monetary and fiscal stances of the peripheries tend to be more 
restrictive than in the center country for two reasons. First, as capital and goods markets of periph-
ery countries are underdeveloped and small, an acceleration of reserve accumulation leads to liquid-
ity overhangs when the thriving reserve money creation does not meet sufficient demand. The pe-
riphery central banks can counteract the resulting inflationary pressure with a broad variety of ster-
ilization measures such as sales of central bank bonds, increasing reserve requirements or deposit 
taking auctions.  
 
The sterilization measures tend to only be effective in the short-term, as every monetary tightening 
will push interest rates upwards and attract additional capital inflows. This sets the stage for restric-
tive fiscal policies. As the economy and tax revenues grow, additional expenditure contributes to 
higher inflation and possibly to overheating. Therefore, in cooperation with the central bank, the 
governments of emerging market economies may increase deposits at the central bank (Schnabl and 
Schobert 2008).
7 The effectiveness of sterilization rises as monetary contraction is accompanied by 
lower government expenditure.
8 As shown in Figure 6 since the turn of the millennium in particular 
the dollar peripheries have experienced substantially improving fiscal positions relative to their cen-
ters as well as rising government deposits with the central bank (Figure 7). Alternatively additional 
government revenues can be stored in sovereign wealth funds. 
 
With the current account balance corresponding to the sum of private and public net savings, the 
relative monetary and fiscal policy positions are an important determinant of global imbalances. If 
the fiscal policy is restrictive relative to the anchor country for instance due to rising government 
deposits with the central bank, the public saving balance will turn positive. In addition, the restric-
tive fiscal policy will have a restrictive effect on private investment, consumption and imports. The 
current account balance improves. As shown in Figure 8 which plots the cumulated fiscal and cur-
rent account positions in terms of US dollars, the interdependence between current account and 
general government balances is most obvious for the Middle East, the CIS and (Latin) America. If, 
as in many oil exporting countries, export sectors are directly owned by the government, rising cur-
rent account surpluses which are for instance caused by rising raw material prices are directly trans-
formed into rising government surpluses. Indirectly, government surpluses may increase due to ris-
                                                 
7   This implies that there is – as in most emerging markets and developing countries – no strict institutional separation 
between the government and the central bank.  
8    This setting is equivalent to a coordination of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies within the Mundell-
Fleming framework: Monetary contraction is accompanied by fiscal contraction to make the restrictive stance effec-
tive in an open economy.  
  16ing tax revenues. The outcome is that twin surpluses in the periphery countries match a twin deficit 
in the center.   
 
In East Asia where the private manufacturing sector can be seen as the main source of rising net 
exports the link between current account surpluses and government budgets is weaker (Figure 8), as 
the government revenues are only indirectly affected by buoyant growth via higher tax incomes. 
Here rising current account surpluses reflect rising (lower) private savings (investment), which can 
be explained by the sterilization operations of the monetary authorities. Every tightening of money 
supply will lead to higher interest rates which result in more private saving and less investment. The 
saving-investment balance of the private sector improves and the current account surplus rises.  
 
China since the middle of this decade to 2008, provides an important case study of a relative fiscal 
and monetary tightening versus the US (McKinnon and Schnabl 2009). While the Chinese dollar 
peg contributed to rapid reserve accumulation and monetary expansion, the central bank has en-
gaged in extensive sterilization operations and monetary tightening via higher reserve requirements 
and sales of central bank bonds. The sterilization policies have contributed to increasing interest 
rates and thereby higher saving and lower investment. At the same time, the Chinese government 
has run increasing government surpluses which have been partially deposited with the central bank. 
To this end, a rising Chinese current account surplus can be seen as the outcome of the macroeco-
nomic response to buoyant capital inflows from low interest rate financial centers.  
 
3.2. Market Transmission 
 
The interdependence of the macroeconomic policies alone may not fully explain the transmission of 
current account imbalances from centers to peripheries. Given changes in relative monetary and 
fiscal positions of center and periphery countries, relative price changes are also likely to affect the 
relative aggregate saving and investment behavior. These changes can be either achieved via ex-
change rate changes as for instance between the US and the euro periphery. Alternatively, if ex-
change rates are fixed, relative prices matter. Given the asymmetric pattern of the world currency 
system with exchange rates being stabilized along the horizontal axes of the current account asym-
metry matrix, adjustment via exchange rates can mainly take place along the vertical axes. Along 
the horizontal axes, relative prices matter.  
 
  17The notion that current account imbalances can be corrected via nominal exchange rate changes is 
based on the elasticity approach to international trade which is central in both Keynesian (Meade 
1951) and monetarist models (Friedman 1953). Given a price elastic import demand and constant 
export prices in foreign currency, appreciation inflates the international price of exports and deflates 
the domestic price of imports. The current account surplus shrinks if international trade is sensitive 
to relative price changes. With the elasticity approach in mind, many scholars have proposed an 
appreciation of the East Asian currencies to address the East Asian-US current account imbalance 
(see for instance Cline 2005). Similarly, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004) argue that the 
East Asian countries prevented an adjustment of global imbalances by keeping their exchange rates 
stable against the dollar.  
 
Elasticity pessimists (McKinnon 2007 and Qiao 2007) have argued that in a globalized world no-
minal exchange rate adjustment is not an effective tool to cope with current account asymmetries. 
For instance, in Japan following the Plaza-Agreement the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen 
against the dollar did not correct the trade imbalance with the US for two reasons (McKinnon and 
Ohno 1997). First, Japanese export prices declined in response to appreciation (incomplete pass-
through). Second, appreciation and declining exports led to a “high-yen induced” recession which 
caused a fall in imports leaving the effect on the current account balance indeterminate. In line with 
McKinnon and Ohno (1997), the strong appreciation of the euro against the dollar between 2002 
and 2007 did not correct the current account imbalance between Germany and the US along the left 
hand vertical axis of the current account asymmetry matrix. 
 
If exchange rates are kept stable between centers and peripheries an adjustment of current account 
imbalances can take place via relative price changes. Because since the 1980s global consumer 
price inflation has been moderate and consumer price inflation between center and periphery coun-
tries has converged, the impact of consumer prices on the terms of trade has been modest. Neverthe-
less, substantial relative price fluctuations of (highly volatile) raw material and food prices and (the 
more stable) industrial prices have affected the current account positions of centers and peripheries.  
 
In the current account asymmetry matrix as in Figure 6 the two centers and Emerging Europe can 
be characterized as countries which are dominated by industrial production. In the dollar periphery 
the export sectors of the Middle East, the CIS and (Latin) America are dominated by raw material 
and food production. The relative price changes have been most pronounced between the raw mate-
rial exporting countries and the industrial goods exporting countries. In particular since the turn of 
  18the millennium until 2008, raw material and food prices have increased substantially relative to in-
dustrial goods prices. This explains the rising current account surpluses of the Middle East, the CIS 
and (Latin) America and rising deficits of the US and many European countries.  
 
4. Econometric Estimations 
 
As shown in sections 2 and 3 the asymmetry matrix in global current accounts can be seen as the 
outcome of a set of interdependent macroeconomic policy and price variables which affect the cur-
rent account positions of single countries or country groups in one or the other direction. To test for 
the current account asymmetry matrix we perform panel estimations.  
 
4.1. Data and Estimation Framework 
 
The sample contains the US and Germany as center countries and 99 periphery countries. The pe-
riphery sub-samples contain the largest countries of six peripheries as identified in Table 1. The 
dollar periphery is subdivided in (Latin) America (19 countries), East Asia (18 countries), the Mid-
dle East (14 countries), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (12 countries). The 
euro periphery is subdivided in Emerging Europe (20 countries) and non-Germany Industrialized 
Europe (16 countries).  
 
The time period starts – if data are available – in 1981 and goes up to the year 2006. For the former 
socialist economies (CIS and Emerging Europe) the samples starts in 1994 when a wider set of data 
became available for most countries in the sample. Yearly data are the highest frequency for which 
data are available for all macroeconomic variables. Data sources are the IMF (WEO, IFS) and the 
national central banks. Yearly current account data and government deficits are in terms of percent 
of GDP. Interest rates are included in the panel as levels, whereas exchange rates and prices are 
measured in terms of percent changes. Changes in foreign reserves are measured in percent as well. 
A panel unit root test (Choi 2001) reveals that there is no concern about stationary in the data set.  
 
We use a cross-country panel model that explains the macro variables (current account, interest 
rates, reserve accumulation) of the periphery by the macro variables of the centers as well as by 
transmission channels such as exchange rates and factor prices:  
 
it i it i it v w ε δ γ + + = '  ,                              (3) 
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where wit is the vector of the dependent variables from 1981 to 2006. The explanatory variable vit 
consists of the respective explanatory variables and controls. The estimations are made for the 
world as a whole and the respective subsamples. Note that every country in the sample is treated in 
the same way, without being weighted by country size. As we treat the center countries on the left 
hand side of our equations due to their size and independence in macroeconomic policy making as 
exogenous, as outlined in section 2, there is no concern about endogeneity which allows us to use a 
General Least Square (GLS) model. As the null hypothesis of the Hausmann specification test can 




First, we test for the current account identities along the horizontal axes of the current account 
asymmetry matrix. Second, we investigate how the macroeconomic policies of the centers affect the 
macroeconomic policies at the peripheries (macroeconomic policy transmission). Third, we meas-
ure the impact of macroeconomic policies in the center countries on the current account positions of 
the peripheries. Forth, we test if and how relative prices, i.e. changes of exchange rates and prices, 
affect the current account positions of centers and peripheries.  
 
Current Account Identity  
 
As a first step we test for the current account asymmetry matrix as shown in Figure 6 by defining 
the current accounts of the center countries as exogenous and the current accounts of the peripheries 
as endogenous. The first specification treats the US as sole center country and the other regions 
including Germany as peripheries. The results reflect – as shown in Table 3 – the asymmetric cur-
rent account matrix: for the world as a whole as well as for most peripheries including Germany. A 
rising US current account deficit is matched by a rising surplus at the peripheries at statistically 
highly significant levels. The only exception is Emerging Europe which behaves as suggested by 
Figure 6 symmetrically with respect to the US as represented by the positive sign.  
 
Substituting the US for Germany as center country changes the results. Now the world and the dol-
lar peripheries behave symmetrically with Germany at highly significant levels. Emerging Europe 
and Industrialized Europe exhibit an asymmetric current account behavior with respect to Germany 
  20but only the coefficient of Emerging Europe is statistically significant. Also the US is associated 
with an asymmetric current account behavior with respect to Germany.  
 
The estimations with only one center country may be subject to bias as the other center – either 
Germany or US – is omitted from the sample. To cope with this possible omitted variable bias the 
current account identity is estimated with two centers simultaneously. The results reveal that the US 
current account behavior is the main driving force of world current account developments (except 
Emerging Europe). In addition they reflect a clear division of current account balance transmission 
within the two horizontal parts of the current account asymmetry matrix. First, the current account 
balance of the US is clearly linked asymmetrically with the current account balances of East Asia, 
Latin America, the Middle East and the CIS at highly significant levels. The German current ac-
count has no significant impact on the current account position of the dollar peripheries. In contrast, 
the current account position of Emerging Europe behaves asymmetrically to the current account 
position of Germany. The current account positions of the industrialized European countries (ex-




Macroeconomic policies were identified in section 3 as possible determinants of changes in relative 
current account positions. Policy transmission can be understood in three ways. First, there is an 
impact of center monetary policies on foreign exchange intervention and thereby monetary policies 
at the peripheries. Second, center monetary policies are expected to affect periphery monetary poli-
cies in the context of sterilization operations. Third, we would expect that fiscal and monetary poli-
cies in the centers have an impact on fiscal policies at the peripheries.  
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the impact of the center monetary policies on the peripher-
ies’ reserve accumulation. We observe at (mostly) highly significant levels that lower interest rates 
in the US are linked to increasing reserves in both the dollar periphery and Emerging Europe. In 
contrast the impact on foreign reserves in Industrialized Europe where euro area countries dominate 
is insignificant. The finding is similar for the euro area and Germany. Declining euro area (before 
1999 Germany) interest rates contribute to rising reserves in both the dollar and euro peripheries at 
highly significant levels. The Industrialized European countries exhibit rising reserves in response 
to declining interest rates in Germany and the euro area. Estimating the impact of US and German 
(euro area) interest rates simultaneously confirms the results: Interest rate cuts (increases) in the 
  21center countries clearly contribute to faster (slower) reserve accumulation in the periphery coun-
tries, representing the hunt for yield and the resulting exchange rate stabilization in emerging mar-
kets when interest rates in the large financial markets are low.  
 
Given extensive reserve accumulation in the peripheries in response to interest cuts in the centers, 
interest rate movements of centers and peripheries should be highly correlated as full sterilization of 
the monetary effects of foreign exchange intervention is not possible (Schnabl and Schobert 2008). 
However, the international transmission of interest rate changes might be imperfect because con-
trols to international capital flows exist and / or interest rates are not determined by market forces in 
repressed financial markets. The estimation results are reported in Table 5.
9 US interest rates are 
clearly positively correlated with interest rates in other regions in the world. A declining (increas-
ing) interest rate in the US is linked to declining interest rates in all regions except Latin America at 
highly significant levels. Different sizes of the coefficients reflect different interest rate levels. In 
high inflation regions such as Latin America and CIS the coefficient is substantially above one, in 
Germany and for other European countries the coefficient is below unity.  
 
For Germany and the euro area the evidence is mixed. There is a positive correlation of euro 
area/German interest rates with interest rates in East Asia, the CIS, Emerging Europe and Industrial-
ized Europe. But for (Latin) America and the Middle East the evidence is weak. The respective co-
efficients have a negative sign or are insignificant. The simultaneous estimation of US and euro 
area/German interest rates as determinants of interest rates in the periphery countries suggest that 
the interest rate levels in the Middle East are clearly influenced by US interest rates. In the CIS and 
Emerging Europe there is strong evidence that euro area/German monetary policy has an impact on 
liquidity conditions. In East Asia and Industrialized Europe both the US and euro area have an im-
pact on monetary policy decisions. All in all, there is strong evidence that interest rates at the pe-




In a third step we test for the interaction of the fiscal policies in the US and Germany with fiscal 
policies at the peripheries. As argued above, the relationship between fiscal policies between center 
and periphery countries is not straightforward. If a coordinated expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy in the center triggers, via the exchange rate channel, an economic upswing in the periphery 
  22countries, the fiscal policy stances will tend to improve due to rising tax incomes. If the risk of in-
flation and overheating increases, governments may take restrictive action by depositing govern-
ment revenues with the central bank. Then a twin deficit in the center country (negative current ac-
count and rising public deficit) will be matched by twin surpluses as the Middle East, CIS and Latin 
America in Figure 8. Alternatively a worldwide economic upswing can contribute to improved fis-
cal balances in both center and periphery countries which implies a positive relationship.  
 
The results concerning the interaction of fiscal policies show either negative or positive relation-
ships (Table 6).
10 For instance, a rising deficit in the US is linked to an improved fiscal position of 
the East Asian countries and Emerging Europe. In contrast, the fiscal positions of (Latin) America, 
the Middle East, Industrialized Europe and Germany move in the same direction as the US deficit at 
highly significant levels. For Germany an asymmetric behavior of general government balances is 
found for (Latin) America and a positive correlation for Emerging Europe, while all other regions 
remain insignificant. To this end, there is no clear evidence for a certain interdependence of fiscal 
policies between center and periphery countries.   
 
 
Macroeconomic Policies and Current Accounts   
 
Having analyzed the international transmission of macroeconomic policies from centers to peripher-
ies, the impact of the macroeconomic policies in the centers on the current account positions of the 
peripheries is traced (Table 7). For the US fiscal deficit there is a positive relationship with the cur-
rent positions of the periphery world, although the coefficients of most regions are insignificant. In 
contrast, US interest rate decisions have a highly significant impact on the current account positions 
of East Asia, (Latin) America, the CIS, Industrialized Europe and Germany. As US interest rates 
decline (increase) the current account deficits at the periphery decrease (increase) or the surpluses 
increase (decrease).  
 
For the euro area/Germany this effect is even stronger as a declining interest rate in Germany im-
plies declining current account deficits or increasing current account surpluses in East Asia, (Latin) 
America, Middle East, CIS and Industrialized Europe at highly significant levels. The major excep-
tion is Emerging Europe where declining euro area/German interest rates are associated with rising 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9   The small size of the coefficients represents a higher level of interest rates in the periphery countries due to a higher 
level of macroeconomic instability.  
10  Adding growth as control variable does not change the main results.   
  23current account deficits.  The evidence in favor of a systematic impact of German fiscal policy on 
fiscal policies in the peripheries is weak with the major exception of Emerging Europe where a de-
clining German deficit is associated with rising deficits in Emerging Europe.  
 
To this end the results as reported in Table 7 confirm the strong impact of the macroeconomic poli-
cies in the center countries on the current account positions in the periphery countries with particu-





Finally, the role of prices as transmission channels of the current account imbalances is analyzed. 
According to the elasticity approach, relative prices are a crucial determinant of international com-
petitiveness affecting relative current account positions. We use oil, copper and metal prices as a 
proxy for the terms of trade of raw material exporting countries which prevail in (Latin) America, 
Middle East and CIS. Industrial prices are used as a proxy for the terms of trade of the industrial 
and industrializing countries (US, Germany, Industrialized Europe, East Asia, Emerging Europe).  
 
The results are reported in Table 8.  Oil prices are associated as expected with rising current account 
surpluses in East Asia, (Latin) America, Middle East and CIS at highly significant levels. For 
Emerging Europe and all industrialized countries no impact of oil prices on current account posi-
tions can be traced at the common significance levels, although for the US and Emerging Europe 
the sign of the coefficient is negative. Rising industrial prices are found to have a significant posi-
tive impact on the current account balances of East Asia, the Middle East and Germany. In contrast, 
for the net importers Emerging Europe and the US the term is negative suggesting that rising indus-
trial prices are accompanied by a worsening current account position.  
 
To test for the impact of other raw material prices on current account positions of world regions, we 
substitute industrial prices for copper prices for (Latin) America as this region is an important ex-
porter of all kinds of minerals. Similarly, industrial prices are substituted for metal prices for the 
CIS. Both proxies confirm the important role of copper, metal and mineral prices in general for the 
current account position of these regions.  
 
  24The evidence for a significant impact of the euro/dollar exchange rate on world current accounts is 
mixed. Dollar depreciation (euro appreciation) leads to improved current accounts of the countries 
in the Middle East and the CIS.
11 Also for the US, in line with the elasticity approach to the current 
account dollar depreciation is associated with an improved current account position at high signifi-
cant levels. Euro appreciation (dollar depreciation) is clearly linked to worsening current account 
positions in Emerging Europe. Exchange rate stabilization as represented by percent changes of 
foreign reserves has a positive impact on the current account position of East Asia, Middle East, 
CIS, and Emerging Europe. For the other regions, the coefficients remain insignificant.     
 
Note that the macroeconomic policies in the centers are likely to influence relative prices, as for 
instance US monetary expansion and dollar depreciation may lead to rising raw material prices for 
two reasons. First, on the demand side a low global interest rate level, boost production and demand 
in emerging market economies such as China. Second, as dollar revenues in raw material trade are 
devalued in real terms, the raw material exporters increases prices.  
  
5. Outlook: The Asymmetry Matrix and the Global Crisis 
 
We have argued that the macroeconomic policy decisions in the center countries of the world mone-
tary system have a considerable impact on the macroeconomic policies and fundamentals in the 
countries at the peripheries of the world monetary system. Since the early 1980s macroeconomic 
policies in the US have tended to be more active than in the Europe. In times of rising fiscal expen-
diture, expansionary monetary policies allowed drawing on credit from a rising number of countries 
at the dollar periphery, in particular East Asian and raw material exporting countries.  
 
The econometric estimations identified two main transmission channels from expansionary US ma-
cro policies to rising net goods and capital exports of dollar periphery countries. First, there is the 
interaction of foreign exchange intervention, monetary expansion and sterilization policies, also 
including fiscal coordination of sterilization policies via government deposits at the central banks 
and stabilization funds. Second, in the case of the raw material exporting countries, the impact of 
US interest rates on the dollar depreciation and raw material prices transmitted the global imbal-
ances. Because in contrast to the US, euro area and German macroeconomic policies have tended to 
be more restrictive, the euro area periphery could run a negative current account balance to finance 
the economic catch-up process.  
                                                 
11    Here, dollar depreciation corresponds to a declining euro/dollar exchange rate. 
  25 
During the year 2007, the world experienced, originating in the US subprime market, an unprece-
dented financial turmoil, which may or may not lead to an unraveling of the global imbalances as 
represented by the current account asymmetry matrix. The global current account imbalances will 
be smaller if international private investors become more unwilling to invest in the US after having 
realized substantial losses in their asset backed portfolios. In this context, for instance German capi-
tal exports to the US and to other regions such as Emerging Europe may shrink, international trade 
volumes will decline and bilateral current account imbalances will be more moderate.  
 
In contrast, the impact on public international financial flows may be the opposite. As US interest 
rates have declined drastically and the Federal Reserve has moved towards a quantitative easing, 
capital outflows into the peripheries are likely to increase again. To this end, reserve accumulation 
in form of foreign exchange intervention may accelerate again with intensified need for sterilization 
policies and investment in US government bonds. Then, further rising global imbalances will be 
increasingly accompanied by the accumulation of US government bonds by dollar periphery coun-
tries. The only way out of this dilemma would be that a rising number of dollar periphery countries 
may decide to switch their exchange rate pegs to the euro.  
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Source: IMF, * Aggregated GDP (2006) is in billions of US dollars in brackets. 
 
 
  28Figure 3: Central Bank Balance Sheet Matrix 
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic Policy Behavior of Center Countries  













































Source: IFS and WEO 2008. The general government deficits are measured as percent of GDP. 
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  30 Figure 5: General Government Deficit Matrix  
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  34 Table 1: Country Groups 
Region Countries 
(Latin)  America  ($)  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,   
Uruguay, Venezuela 
East Asia ($)  Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam 
Middle East ($)  Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Ara-
bia, Syria, UAE, Yemen 
CIS  ($)  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbeki-
stan 
Emerging  Europe  (€)  Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Mo-
rocco, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Tunisia, Turkey 
Industrialized Europe excl. Germany (€)  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,  
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK 
                                    
 
 
Table 2: Structure of the Panel 
Area Region  Array  Number 
US 0  0  1 
(Latin) America (LA)  1  1-19  19 
East Asia (EA)  2  20-32  13 
Middle East (ME)  3  33-46  14 
CIS (CIS)  4  47-58  12 
Emerging Europe (EE)  5  59-78  20 
Industrialized Europe excl. Germany  6  79-95  16 
Germany 7  96  1 
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Table 3: Determinants of World and Regional Current Account Balances (1981* - 2006) 
* Aggregates of the CIS and Emerging Europe are based on data from 1994 to 2006. 
** Numbers differ for separate and simultaneous estimates of US and Germany. 
Regression on current 
accounts of aggregates: 




CIS Emerging  Ind. Eur.  Germany United 
States  Asia  Europe  ex. GER 








-0.024***  -0.002  -0.006   
(0.004)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.007) 















Adjusted R-squared  0.509  0.771  0.661 0.204 0.514 0.475  0.537  0.279   




-0.051***  0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.055***  -0.049***  0.010***   -0.021*** 
(0.003)  (0.007))  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004) 




0.505***  1.382*** 
(0.413) 
1.247***  -0.590*** 





Adjusted R-squared  0.496  0.761  0.637 0.162 0.444 0.475  0.520    0.279 




-0.069***  -0.054*** 
(0.017) 
-0.155***  -0.036***  -0.005    
(0.004)  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.003) 




-0.856***  -2.579*** 
(0.608) 
-3.127***  0.418  -0.678***    
(0.146)  (0.651)  (0.269)  (0.117) 




0.125  0.214 
(0.489) 
-0.767 






Adjusted R-squared  0.508  0.771  0.661 0.202 0.519 0.478  0.558     
Observations**  2332/2306  460  494 355 156 256  402  26 26 
Countries**  100/99  18  19 14 12 20  16  1 1 
  36 Table 4: Determinants of World and Regional Reserve Accumulation (1981*-2006) 














































Adj. R-squared  0.677  0.863  0.459 0.294 0.570 0.725  0.590  0.451   
















Euro area/German  in-

















Adjusted R-squared  0.680  0.861  0.428 0.311 0.597 0.694  0.594    0.140 















































Adjusted R-squared  0.683  0.880  0.464 0.311 0.595 0.733  0.594     
Observations**  2220/2194  413  491 308 156 257  406  26 26 
Countries**  99/98  17  19 14 12 20  16  1 1 
* Aggregates of the CIS and Emerging Europe are based on data from 1994 to 2006. 
** Numbers differ for separate and simultaneous estimates of US and Germany. 
 
 
  37 Table 5: Determinants of World and Regional Interest Rates (1981*-2006) 
Regression on interest 
rates of aggregates: 














































Adjusted R-squared  0.002  0.725  0.005 0.129 0.086 0.272  0.420  0.384   


































Adjusted R-squared  0.002  0.724  0.004 0.107 0.260 0.284  0.578    0.369 















































Adjusted R-squared  0.002  0.730  0.004 0.126 0.253 0.288  0.602     
Observations**  1896/1870  383  405 232 114 226  400  26 26 
Countries**  96/95  18  19 12 10 19  16  1 1 
* Aggregates of the CIS and Emerging Europe are based on data from 1994 to 2006. 
** Numbers differ for separate and simultaneous estimates of US and Germany. 
 
  38 Table 6: Transmission of Center Fiscal Policies to Periphery Fiscal Policies (1981*-2006) 
Regression on deficits of 
aggregates: 














































Adjusted R-squared  0.286  0.255  0.343 0.187 0.327 0.512  0.594  0.081   
































Adjusted R-squared  0.286  0.251  0.325 0.155 0.327 0.500  0.537    0.081 













































Adjusted R-squared  0.286  0.254  0.357 0.189 0.324 0.520  0.594     
Observations**  2332/2306  442  481 342 154 257  414  26 26 
Countries**  100/99  18  19 14 12 20  16  1 1 
* Aggregates of the CIS and Emerging Europe are based on data from 1994 to 2006. 
** Numbers differ for separate and simultaneous estimates of US and Germany. 
  39 Table 7: Transmission of Center Macro Policies on Periphery Current Accounts (1981* -2006) 
Regression on current 
accounts of aggregates: 































































Adjusted R-squared  0.492  0.758  0.633 0.144 0.392 0.399  0.560  0.078   
















































Adjusted R-squared  0.498  0.760  0.655 0.160 0.382 0.467  0.551    0.586 
Observations  2332  460  494 355 156 256  402  26 26 
Countries  100  18  19 14 12 20  16  1 1 
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Table 8: Market Transmission on Periphery Current Accounts (1981*-2006) 
Regression on current 
accounts: 




































































- - -  -  -  - 
Metal price (β4)  - 
 
- -  -  0.168*** 
(0.038) 
-  - - - 






































Adjusted R-squared  0.348  0.510  0.641 0.231 0.519 0.442  0.577  0.168  0.587 
Observations  2148  395  473 295 156 256  385  25 25 
Countries  101  17  19 14 12 20  16  1 1 
* Aggregates of the CIS and Emerging Europe are based on data from 1994 to 2006. 
  41 Universität Leipzig 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 
 
Nr.  1  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Stock Options wegen oder gegen Shareholder Value? 
Vergütungsmodelle für Vorstände und  Führungskräfte 
04/98 
Nr.  2  Thomas Lenk / Volkmar Teichmann  Bei der Reform der Finanzverfassung die neuen Bundesländer nicht vergessen! 
10/98 
Nr.  3  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Gedanken über Führen – Dienen – Verantworten  
11/98 
Nr. 4  Kristin Wellner  Möglichkeiten und Grenzen kooperativer Standortgestaltung zur Revitalisie 
rung von Innenstädten  
12/98 
Nr. 5  Gerhardt Wolff  Brauchen wir eine weitere Internationalisierung der Betriebswirtschaftslehre? 
01/99 
Nr. 6  Thomas Lenk / Friedrich Schneider  Zurück zu mehr Föderalismus: Ein Vorschlag zur Neugestaltung des Finanz 
ausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichti- 
gung der neuen Bundesländer  
12/98 
Nr: 7  Thomas Lenk  Kooperativer Förderalismus – Wettbewerbsorientierter Förderalismus  
03/99 
Nr. 8  Thomas Lenk / Andreas Mathes  EU – Osterweiterung – Finanzierbar? 
03/99 
Nr. 9  Thomas Lenk / Volkmar Teichmann  Die fisikalischen Wirkungen verschiedener Forderungen zur Neugestaltung des 
Länderfinanzausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 
Eine empirische Analyse unter Einbeziehung der Normenkontrollanträge der  
Länder Baden-Würtemberg, Bayern und Hessen sowie der Stellungnahmen 
verschiedener Bundesländer 
09/99 
Nr. 10  Kai-Uwe Graw  Gedanken zur Entwicklung der Strukturen im Bereich der Wasserversorgung  
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung kleiner und  mittlerer Unternehmen 
10/99 
Nr. 11  Adolf Wagner  Materialien zur Konjunkturforschung 
12/99 
Nr. 12  Anja Birke  Die Übertragung westdeutscher Institutionen auf die ostdeutsche Wirklichkeit – 
erfolgversprechendes Zusammenspiel oder Aufdeckung systematischer Mängel?
Ein empirischer Bericht für den kommunalen Finanzausgleich am Beispiel Sach
02/00 
Nr. 13  Rolf H. Hasse  Internationaler Kapitalverkehr in den letzten 40 Jahren – Wohlstandsmotor oder 
Krisenursache?  
03/00 
Nr. 14  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Unternehmensführung (Corporate Governance) und Hauptversammlung  
04/00 
Nr. 15  Adolf Wagner  Materialien zur Wachstumsforschung  
03/00 
Nr. 16  Thomas Lenk / Anja Birke  Determinanten des kommunalen Gebührenaufkommens unter beso
Berücksichtigung der neuen Bundesländer  
04/00 
Nr. 17  Thomas Lenk  Finanzwirtschaftliche Auswirkungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteils zum 
Länderfinanzausgleich vom 11.11.1999  
04/00 
Nr. 18  Dirk Bültel  Continous linear utility for preferences on convex sets in normal real vector 
05/00 
Nr. 19  Stefan Dierkes / Stephanie Hanrath Steuerung  dezentraler Investitionsentscheidungen bei nutzungsabhängigem und 
nutzungsunabhängigem Verschleiß des Anlagenvermögens 
06/00 
Nr. 20  Thomas Lenk / Andreas Mathes / Olaf Hirschefeld  Zur Trennung von Bundes- und Landeskompetenzen in der Finanzverfassung  
Deutschlands  
07/00 
Nr. 21  Stefan Dierkes  Marktwerte, Kapitalkosten und Betafaktoren bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung  
10/00 
Nr. 22  Thomas Lenk  Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relationships in Germany: Requirement for
Regulations? 
03/01 
Nr. 23  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Stock Options – Aktuelle Fragen Besteuerung, Bewertung, Offenlegung 
03/01 
Nr.  24  Thomas  Lenk  Die „kleine Reform“ des Länderfinanzausgleichs als Nukleus für die 
Finanzverfassungsreform“? 
10/01 
Nr. 25  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Biotechnologie im Spannungsfeld von Menschenwürde, Forschung, Markt und 
Moral 
Wirtschaftsethik zwischen Beredsamkeit und Schweigen  
11/01   2
 
Nr. 26  Thomas Lenk  Finanzwirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Neuregelung des bundestaatlichen  
Finanzausgleichs - 
Eine allkoative und distributive Wirkungsanalyse für das Jahr 2005 
11/01 
Nr. 27  Sören Bär  Grundzüge eines Tourismusmarketing, untersucht für den Südraum Leipzig 
05/02 
Nr. 28  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex: 
Zuwahl (comply) oder Abwahl (explain)? 
06/02 
Nr. 29  Adolf Wagner  Konjunkturtheorie, Globalisierung und Evolutionsökonomik 
08/02 
Nr. 30  Adolf Wagner  Zur Profilbildung der Universitäten 
08/02 
Nr. 31  Sabine Klinger / Jens Ulrich / Hans-Joachim 
Rudolph 
Konjunktur als Determinante des Erdgasverbrauchs in der ostdeutschen Industrie
10/02 
Nr. 32  Thomas Lenk / Anja Birke  The Measurement of Expenditure Needs in the Fiscal Equalization at the Loca
Empirical Evidence from German Municipalities 
10/02 
Nr. 33  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Die Lust am Fliegen 
Eine Parabel auf viel Corporate Governance und wenig Unternehmensführung 
11/02 
Nr. 34  Udo Hielscher  Wie reich waren die reichsten Amerikaner wirklich? 
(US-Vermögensbewertungsindex 1800 – 2000) 
12/02 
Nr. 35  Uwe Haubold / Michael Nowak  Risikoanalyse für Langfrist-Investments 
- Eine simulationsbasierte Studie – 
12/02 
Nr. 36  Thomas Lenk  Die Neuregelung des bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs – auf Basis der  
Steuerschätzung Mai 2002 und einer aktualisierten Bevölkerungsstatistik - 
12/02 
Nr. 37  Uwe Haubold / Michael Nowak  Auswirkungen der Renditeverteilungsannahme auf Anlageentscheidungen 
- Eine simulationsbasierte Studie - 
02/03 
Nr. 38  Wolfgang Bernhard  Corporate Governance Kondex für den Mittel-Stand? 
06/03 
Nr. 39  Hermut Kormann  Familienunternehmen: Grundfragen mit finanzwirtschaftlichen Bezug 
10/03 
Nr. 40  Matthias Folk  Launhardtsche Trichter 
11/03 
Nr. 41  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Corporate Governance statt Unternehmensführung 
11/03 
Nr. 42  Thomas Lenk / Karolina Kaiser  Das Prämienmodell im Länderfinanzausgleich – Anreiz- und Verteilungsmitwirk
11/03 
Nr. 43  Sabine Klinger  Die Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung des Haushaltsektors in einer Matrix 
03/04 
Nr. 44  Thomas Lenk / Heide Köpping  Strategien zur Armutsbekämpfung und –vermeidung in Ostdeutschland: 
05/04 
Nr. 45  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Sommernachtsfantasien  
Corporate Governance im Land der Träume. 
07/04 
Nr. 46  Thomas Lenk / Karolina Kaiser  The Premium Model in the German Fiscal Equalization System 
12/04 
Nr. 47  Thomas Lenk / Christine Falken Komparative  Analyse  ausgewählter Indikatoren des Kommunalwirtschaft- 
lichen Gesamtergebnisses 
05/05 
Nr. 48  Michael Nowak / Stephan Barth  Immobilienanlagen im Portfolio institutioneller Investoren am Beispiel von 
Versicherungsunternehmen 
-Auswirkungen auf die Risikosituation- 
08/05 
Nr. 49  Wolfgang Bernhardt  Familiengesellschaften – Quo Vadis? 
Vorsicht vor zu viel „Professionalisierung“ und Ver-Fremdung 
11/05 
Nr. 50  Christian Milow  Der Griff des Staates nach dem Währungsgold 
12/05 
Nr. 51  Anja Eichhorst / Karolina Kaiser  The  Instiutional Design of Bailouts and Its Role in Hardening Budget 
Constraints in Federations 
03/06 
Nr. 52  Ullrich Heilemann / Nancy Beck  Die Mühen der Ebene – Regionale Wirtschaftsförderung in Leipzig 1991 bis 
2004 
08/06 
Nr. 53  Gunther Schnabl  Die Grenzen der monetären Integration in Europa 
08/06 
Nr. 54  Hermut Kormann  Gibt es so etwas wie typisch mittelständige Strategien? 
11/06   3
 
Nr. 55  Wolfgang Bernhardt  (Miss-)Stimmung, Bestimmung und Mitbestimmung 
Zwischen Juristentag und Biedenkopf-Kommission 
11/06 
Nr. 56  Ullrich Heilemann / Annika Blaschzik  Indicators and the German Business Cycle - A Multivariate Perspective on 
Indicators of lfo, OECD, and ZEW 
01/07 
Nr. 57  Ullrich Heilemann  “THE SOUL OF A NEW MACHINE” ZU DEN ANFÄNGEN DES RWI- 
KONJUNKTURMODELLS 
12/06 
Nr. 58  Ullrich Heilemann / Roland Schuhr / Annika 
Blaschzik 
ZUR EVOLUTION DES DEUTSCHEN KONJUNKTURZYKLUS 1958 BIS  
2004- 
ERGEBNISSE EINER DYNAMISCHEN DISKRIMINANZANALYSE 
01/07 
Nr. 59  Christine Falken / Mario Schmidt  Kameralistik versus Doppik 
Zur Informationsfunktion des alten und neuen Rechnungswesens der  
Kommunen 
Teil I: Einführende und Erläuternde Betrach  tungen zum Systemwechsel im  
kommunalen Rechnungswesen 
01/07 
Nr. 60  Christine Falken / Mario Schmidt  Kameralistik versus Doppik 
Zur Informationsfunktion des alten und neuen Rechnungswesens der  
Kommunen 
Teil II 
Bewertung der Informationsfunktion im Vergleich 
01/07 
Nr. 61  Udo Hielscher  MONTI DELLA CITTA DI FIRENZE 
Innovative Finanzierungen im Zeitalter Der Medici. Wurzeln der modernen  
Finanzmärkte 
03/07 
Nr. 62  Ullrich Heilemann / Stefan Wappler  SACHSEN WÄCHST ANDERS - KONJUNKTURELLE; SEKTORALE  
UND REGIONALE BESTIMMUNGS GRÜNDE DER ENTWICKLUNG   
DER BRUTTOWERTSCHÖPFUNG 1992 BIS 2006 
07/2007 
Nr. 63  Adolf Wagner  REGIONALÖKONOMIK:  
KONVERGIERENDE  ODER DIVERGIERENDE REGIONALENTWICK- 
LUNGEN 
08/2007 
Nr. 64  Ullrich Heilemann / Jens Ulrich    GOOD BYE; PROFESSOR PHILLIPS? 
          ZUM WANDEL DER TARIFLOHNDETERMINANTEN IN DER 
          BUNDESREPUBLIK 1952 – 2004 
        08/2007 
Nr. 65  Gunther Schnabl / Franziska Schobert    Monetary Policy Operations of Debtor Central Banks in MENA Countries 
        10/07 
Nr. 66  Andreas Schäfer / Simone Valente    Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism, and Population Dynamics 
        11/07 
Nr. 67  Wolfgang Bernhardt      5 Jahre Deutscher Corporate Governance Kondex 
        Eine  Erfolgsgeschichte? 
        01/2008 
Nr. 68  Ullrich Heilemann / Jens Ulrich    Viel Lärm um wenig? Zur Empirie von Lohnformeln in der Bundesrepublik 
        01/2008 
Nr. 69  Christian Groth / Karl-Josef Koch /    When economic growth is less than exponential 
  Thomas M. Steger      02/2008 
Nr. 70  Andreas Bohne / Linda Kochmann    Ökonomische Umweltbewertung und endogene Entwicklung peripherer  
        Regionen  –  Synthese  einer Methodik und einer Theorie 
        02/2008 
Nr. 71  Andreas Bohne / Linda Kochmann /    Deutsch-tschechische Bibliographie Studien der kontingenten Bewertung in 
  Jan Slavík / Lenka Slavíková      Mittel- und Osteuropa 
        06/2008 
Nr. 72  Paul Lehmann / Christoph Schröter-Schlaack   Regulating Land Development with Tradable Permits: 
          What Can We Learn from Air Pollution Control? 
        08/2008 
Nr. 73  Ronald McKinnon / Gunther Schnabl                China’s Exchange Rate Impasse and the Weak U.S. Dollar 
                         10/2008   
 
Nr: 74  Wolfgang Bernhardt      Managervergütungen in der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise 
          Rückkehr zu (guter) Ordnung, (klugem) Maß und (vernünftigem) Ziel? 
        12/2008 
 
Nr. 75  Moritz Schularick / Thomas M. Steger                 Financial Integration, Investment, and Economic Growth:  
                                                              Evidence From Two Eras of Financial Globalization 
                        12/2008 
Nr. 76  Gunther Schnabl / Stephan Freitag    An Asymmetry Matrix in Global Current Accounts 
        01/2009 